

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 OMB-01 ACDA-07 SAJ-01 TRSE-00 CU-02 /092 W
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P R 151021Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3101
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 0664

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, XF, CSCE, PARM, WTP, UR, IT, CH
SUBJECT: ITALIAN FONMIN MEETINGS WITH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO

1. SUMMARY: POL COUNS AND EMBOFF USED OCCASION OF FORMER'S
INITIAL CALL ON ITALIAN COUNTERPART FABIO MIGLIORINI, JANUARY 13 TO
GET READOUT ON FONMIN FORLANI'S MEETINGS WITH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO
JANUARY 11-12. MEETING WITH BREZHNEV PROVIDED LITTLE OF SUBSTANTIVE
IMPORTANCE APART FROM HIS COMMENT THAT WITH PEKING'S INTERNAL
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SITUATION IN "GREAT DISORDER" THERE WAS NOTHING NEW REGARDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET UNION
AND CHINA. GROMYKO HAS SOME INTERESTING COMMENTS ON
MIDDLE EAST AND DISARMAMENT, WHILE HIS TREATMENT OF CSCE AND
OTHER ISSUES WAS STANDARD. BILATERAL QUESTIONS WERE NOT A
MAJOR TOPIC AND COMMUNIQUE NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT, WERE
NO MORE SO THAN ITALIANS HAD EXPECTED. FOLLOWING ARE DETAILS BY

SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.

2. MIDDLE EAST: GROMYKO MADE USUAL POINTS ABOUT NEED TO SOLVE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND TO CREATE PALESTINIAN STATE. HE TOLD FORLANI THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WHERE SUCH A STATE WOULD BE LOCATED, BUT IT WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE VERY BIG. POSSIBLY, HE SPECULATED, PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED BY INCORPORATING THE PALESTINIAN STATE SOMEHOW WITH ANOTHER STATE, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD DEPEND ON PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT. ON GENEVA CONFERENCE GROMYKO REPEATED LINE THAT PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENT FROM BEGINNING AND THAT THE SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE RESPONDED TO AN ITALIAN INQUIRY BY SAYING THAT PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN GENEVA MIGHT BE ARRANGED IN THE CONTEXT OF ONE ENLARGED ARAB DELEGATION, BUT STATED THIS WAS ALSO AN ISSUE FOR ARAB DECISION. WHEN GROMYKO ARGUED THAT A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD ONLY COME ABOUT IF THE U.S. PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO MODERATE ITS EXTREME POSITIONS, FORLANI ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO PUT PRESSURE ON ARAB "HAWKS", AND IN PARTICULAR WHETHER GROMYKO PRESSURED QADAFHI TO MODERATE HIS STAND WHEN LATTER WAS IN MOSCOW. GRMYKO APPARENTLY SIDESTEPED THE QUESTION WITH THE COMMENT THAT HE DID NOT NOTICE ANY CHANGE IN LIBIYA'S POSITION DURING HIS TALKS WITH QADAFHI. (SEE MOSCOW 0646 FOR DETAILS ON SOVIET EXCHANGES WITH QADAFHI.)

3. DISARMAMENT: GROMYKO DISCUSSED MBFR BRIEFLY PLAYING ON STANDARD THEMES ABOUT POSITIONS OF EAST (NOT SEEKING ADVANTAGE) AND WEST (TRYING TO DIMINISH SECURITY OF EAST BY ATTEMPTING TO ALTER THE BALANCE), BUT STRESSED THAT HE WAS STILL OPTIMISTIC SINCE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN MANY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CONFIDENTIAL

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PRODUCED GOOD RESULTS AFTER YEARS OF TALK. GROMYKO RECALLED HIS UNGA DISARMAMENT MEMO AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED AS IMPORTANT MDW, CTB, NUF AND CW. HE ARGUED FOR BOTH WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS AND, ACCORDING TO ITALIANS, GAVE MORE STRESS TO NUCLEAR NON-FIRST USE PROPOSAL THAN TO FREEZE ON PACT MEMBERSHIP. FORLANI RECALLED NAC POSITION ON NNFU AND NOTED THAT THIS IS BASED ON REALIZATION OF CONTINUING WP CONVENTIONAL FORCE BUILDUP AND THAT WP PROPOSAL COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO FORLANI'S POINT, INSTEAD HE SAID HE THOUGHT NATO MINISTERS HAD NOT POSSIBLY THOUGHT THROUGH ALL THE ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE BEFORE EXPRESSING THEIR DOUBTS.

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4. CSCE: GROMYKO DEVOTED PART OF DISCUSSION TO ATTACK ON CERTAIN CIRCLES IN U.S. (AND ELSEWHERE) WHICH ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT DETENTE AND HAVE NEGATIVE EVALUATION OF CSCE. HE ASSURED FORLANI, HOWEVER, THAT HE REALIZED THESE ATTITUDES DID NOT CORRESPOND TO OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION AND THEREFORE SOVIETS DO NOT GIVE TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THEM. HE USED USUAL LINE ABOUT AVOIDING BALANCE SHEET POLEMICS AT BELGRADE AND ACHIEVING "CONSTRUCTIVE" RESULTS LOOKING TO THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, ITALINAS BALKED AT USING SUCH FORMULATION IN COMMUNIQUE AND SOVIETS SETTLED FOR FORMULA "POSITIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS" IN BELGRADE. GROMYKO UNDERLINED
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THE IMPORTANCE OF BREZHNEV'S ETE CONFERENCES AND SOVIET DESIRE FOR COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL ACT. HE ADDED AS NOTEWORTHY COMMENT IN CONTEXT OF ETE REMARKS IN SAYING THAT SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO EXAMINE ANY PROPOSALS OF OTHER CSCE STATES. FORLANI DID NOT RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WITH HIS INTERLOCUTOR.

5. BREZHNEV MEETING, JANUARY 12: BREZHNEV SPOKE TO FORLANI MAINLY IN VAGUE GENERALITIES GETTING DOWN TO SPECIFICS ONLY IN THREE AREAS. ON MIDDLE EAST HE REVIEWED SITUATION IN SAME TERMS AS THEY HAD ALREADY HEARD FROM GROMYKO. ON CHINA SITUATION BREZHNEV SAID THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THE SITUATION IN CHINA CONTINUED TO BE VERY UNSTABLE DUE TO INTERNAL DISORDER. FORLANI APPARENTLY QUOTED MAO THAT OUT OF DISORDER SOMETIMES CAME ORDER, TO WHICH BREZHNEV REPLIED THAT FOR THE MOMENT HE COULD SEE ONLY "GREAT DISORDER." BREZHNEV ALSO MENTIONED TWO WP PROPOSALS WITH, AS GROMYKO, STRESS ON THE SECOND NNU.

6. COMMUNIQUE: DIFFICULTIES IN NEGOTIATING COMMUNIQUE WERE ABOUT WHAT ITALIANS HAD EXPECTED. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (WHICH GOT ONLY BRIEF DISCUSSION IN THE MEETINGS) BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT AGREE TO MENTION POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND ITALIANS WOULD NOT AGREE TO LEAVE IT OUT. (BEGIN NNU) ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION THE ITALIANS TRIED TO INSERT LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO WHAT THEY HAD FOUND IN DANISH COMMUNIQUE OF OCTOBER 6 WHEN GROMYKO VISITED COPENHAGEN ("THE SIDES DECLARED THEIR DETERMINATION TO IMPLEMENT COMPLETELY ALL ASPECTS OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON THAT WHICH AFFECTS THEM THEMSELVES AS WELL AS THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER PARTICIPANT STATES.") WHICH APPARENTLY IN DANISH VERSION STRONGLY IMPLIES IMPLEMENTATION WOULD AFFECT INTERNAL AS WELL AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IN THE RUSSIAN THIS FLAVOR IS PRESENT BUT ONLY SUBTLY. SOVIETS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS FORMULA FOR ITALIANS. (COMMENT: STRICTLY PROTECT MIGLIORINI ON THIS POINT AS HE WAS MOST SENSITIVE ABOUT EVEN MENTIONING IT.) (END NNU)

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7. COMMENT: MIGLIORINI EMPHASIZED ROUTINE NATURE OF MEETINGS AND WE ALSO VIEW THEM AS UNEXCEPTIONAL. LACK OF MAJOR BILATERAL ISSUES TO DISCUSS FOCUSED DISCUSSIONS ON GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROBLEMS WHERE, APART FROM AN OCCASIONALLY INTERESTING TURN OF PHRASE, NEITHER SIDE SAID ANYTHING NEW. THE VERY ROUTINENESS OF THE MEETINGS, HOWEVER, IS THE BEST INDICATOR THAT PRESENT ITALIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE IN GOOD SHAPE.
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